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INTRODUCTION 
The financial crash of 2008 triggered a growing critical discussion 
of global capitalism and its legitimacy vis-à-vis state control and 
popular interest.  The definition and understanding of the latter has 
been subject to intense political discussion, as evident in the current 
media.1  Advocates of neo-liberalism have begun to emphasize the 
benevolent effects of the markets in a Hayekian tradition,2 where a 
trickle-down effect will lead to general distribution of income 
generation. This contrasts with the Marxist approach, which 
emphasizes the government’s role in redistribution and curbing 
capitalism in furtherance of general societal advantage.  The 2008 
financial crisis highlighted the limited power individual state actors 
have in influencing internationalized capitalist developments, and, 
consequently, the limited sovereignty states possess vis-à-vis 
globalized finance.  As a result, the market-based democratic state, 
through its government, finds itself caught between conflicting 
demands: acting on behalf of the electorate as its legitimator of 
power, while adhering to the principles of globalized capitalism with 
its demand for competitiveness and economic opportunity.  Growing 
political backlash has exposed this tension over the last few years, 
 
 1. See, e.g., Branko Milanovic, The Higher the Inequality, the More Likely We 
Are to Move Away from Democracy, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/may/02/higher-inequality-move-away-
from-democracy-branko-milanovic-big-data [https://perma.cc/R6WD-864G]; George 
Robinson, Piketty’s Puzzle: Globalization, Inequality and Democracy, GLOBAL 
POL’Y J. (Dec. 9, 2015), 
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/12/2015/piketty%E2%80%99s-puzzle-
globalization-inequality-and-democracy [https://perma.cc/AE87-VUVB]. 
 2. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 
(1948). 
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against the backdrop of populist politicians decrying loss of political 
control vis-à-vis globalization and a wider popular stake in the 
proceeds of global capital gains. 
Almost forty years of predominant neo-liberal discourse in the 
context of globalization resulted in a shift in the perceived relative 
values of, and relationship between, individual and collective 
interests.3  This has had the effect of pitting independently acting, 
opportunity-chasing metropolitan centers against the broader 
collectives represented by the democratic state.  Rather than feeling 
confined to the horizons staked out by their respective state 
territories, cities are now increasingly defining their ambitions, and 
likely their opportunities, through their functional and political 
interrelations within specific interest-based, self-organizing, 
collaborative networks.4  Simply being content with what is available 
in a particular territory no longer suffices for cities reaching outward. 
Inequality, metropolitanism, and elitism have become closely 
associated in recent populist, nationalist rhetoric, which attacks 
globalization and multilateralism as not being in the interest of  
“the People.”  Nationalist sentiment has risen as part of that rhetoric, 
as evidenced by the ascendance of starkly right-wing parties across 
Europe.5 The election of Donald Trump as United States (U.S.) 
president, the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the new 
populist “anti-establishment” Italian government6 are examples of an 
anti-globalist and anti-metropolitan backlash by those feeling 
resentful of being “left behind” – a term frequently used in the press 
and public debate7—as the rewards of economic globalization appear 
to reach some more than others.8 
 
 3. PAUL HOPPER, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES IN AN AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 13–
27 (2017). 
 4. SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBAL NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES 19 (2016); see also 
PETER J. TAYLOR & BEN DERUDDER, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN 
ANALYSIS 179–93 (2015). 
 5. The meaning of “people” is rather diffuse, used in various politically charged 
ways by populist political parties who like to present themselves as the democratic 
voice of those very “people.” See, e.g., David Molloy, What Is Populism, and What 
Does the Term Actually Mean?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43301423 [https://perma.cc/99YT-QR2K]. 
 6. Italy Government: Giuseppe Conte to Head Populist Coalition, BBC NEWS 
(June 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44322429 
[https://perma.cc/JEM2-K88N]; see also Jacopo Brigazzi, New Italian PM Is Proud to 
Be Populist, POLITICO (July 6, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/new-italian-
prime-minister-giuseppe-conte-is-proud-to-be-populist/ [https://perma.cc/8PDU-
KPSU]. 
 7. For discussions of the “left behinds” by globalization, see, e.g., Left in the 
Lurch: Globalisation Has Marginalized Many Regions in the Rich World, 
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Although much of this resentment is economically driven, it also 
reflects a sense of loss of democratic voice in political decision-
making.  This appeal for voice becomes expressed in support for 
individual political parties, and, more broadly, for a representative 
democracy through participation in elections.9  Questions abound 
over the functioning of representative democracy and its ideal of 
egalitarian representation of the populace.10  As economic 
experiences are linked to the principles of liberal democracy, support 
for liberal democracy may be waning with shrinking economic 
rewards.  The populists express what a growing number of people 
may have thought since the austerity politics after the 2008 financial 
crash11: Does democracy work for me? Will the promised trickle-
down effect materialize for me?12 
The issue concerns a central organizational principle: network-
based, metropolitan interests, or territorially bounded state interests?  
States now can allow cities to shine globally, to make the most out of 
their visibility and appeal — on the understanding that the rest of the 
state will also benefit further down the line as a trickle-down effect. 
Alternatively, states may seek to maintain (or increase) the 
cohesiveness of their respective territories and insist on treating the 
cities as just one part of the municipal tier of administration at the 
sub-national level, firmly integrated into the administrative and 
political hierarchy. 
This Article addresses the conundrum of an increasingly apparent 
mismatch between two geographic entities — those economically and 
 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 21, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/10/21/globalisation-has-marginalised-many-
regions-in-the-rich-world [https://perma.cc/73Q9-5T4E]. 
 8. Globalization Benefits Everyone, but Gains Unevenly Distributed: Study, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 8, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/globalization-benefits-
everyone-but-gains-unevenly-distributed-study/a-44122842 [https://perma.cc/BM5U-
8U8S]. 
 9. See Frederick Solt, Economic Inequality and Democratic Political 
Engagement, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 48–60 (2008). 
 10. See, e.g., Sagar Sanyal, A Defense of Democratic Egalitarianism, 109 J. PHIL. 
413, 413–34 (2012).  For more concerned with democratic theory, see generally 
THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (2018). 
 11. On “austerity politics,” see, e.g., Wendy Broen, Sacrificial Citizenship: 
Neoliberalism, Human Capital and Austerity Politics, 23 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 3–14 
(2016). 
 12. Alex Andreou, Opinion, Trickle-Down Economics Is the Greatest Broken 
Promise of Our Lifetime, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/20/trickle-down-economics-
broken-promise-richest-85 [https://perma.cc/9EUH-8DDB]. 
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those politically driven. The former is a mere virtual backcloth to a 
network of hubs (here, the cities) and spokes (the economic and 
political relations), while the latter is a contiguous territory defined by 
circumfusing boundaries.  The economically driven geographic entity 
involves growing territorial variations in economic opportunities, 
whereas politically defined territoriality draws on the egalitarian 
principle of democratic representation in a liberal democracy. The 
Article examines the challenges arising from the growing mismatch 
between the two geographies for democratic governments, with cities 
suggested as crucial connectors between the two. Specifically, this 
Article will use the case study of the Danish-Swedish Øresund Region 
to highlight the interaction between the international sphere, and the 
state, region, and city levels, as they compete in a globalized 
economy.  The examination of this case study will accentuate this 
Article’s main argument that the central role of metropolitan areas 
and larger cities is to function as connectors between the two 
geographies — the collaborative, network-based and the territorially 
defined. Metropolitan regions, in particular, function as the primary 
foci of national competitiveness in a globalized economy. Yet, they 
also act out of self-interest, not merely as agents of the state or region.  
This puts them at the forefront of political criticism — for placing 
self-interest above the collective interests of the nation or region.  
Metropolitan areas are thus experiencing growing popular political 
pressure to reconcile economic self-interest and political belonging to 
a larger entity – the nation or region. 
This Article argues that linking formal territoriality with informal 
spatiality may generate synergy effects. In other words, it means to 
connect (1) the pre-defined formal territorial organization and 
distribution of state power, resources, and democratic legitimacy for 
action, and (2) more fragmented informal spaces loosely and 
temporarily circumscribed by self-organizing and selective networks 
of like-interested actors (e.g., the cities). This includes the dynamics 
and responsiveness of more ad hoc-forming, interest-based 
collaborative groupings and networks. Scope for, and interest in, such 
integration, however, varies. 
This Article is divided into three main parts.  Part I discusses the 
growing gap between political and economic spaces as a result of the 
way in which competitiveness has pushed for the fragmentation of 
economic spaces within states and regions — and its implications for 
democratic legitimacy and sense of mattering among the electorate. 
Part II takes a closer look at metropolitan areas as primary actors, as 
well as indicators of the growing discrepancy between economic and 
political geographies within a state territory. The focus is on the role 
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of metropolitan areas and cities not only in driving competitiveness, 
and thus individualism, but also in functioning as connectors and 
agents of state-territorial cohesiveness to avoid political 
fragmentation and alienation. Part III is divided into two parts. 
Section III.A looks at the example of the international Øresund 
Region between Denmark and Sweden to illustrate the processes and 
tensions discussed in Parts I and II. Section III.B teases out possible 
avenues for resolving the conundrum between individualism-driving 
economic competitiveness and the collective, egalitarian ambitions of 
representative democracy. 
I.  METROPOLITANISM AND THE “REST”: DEMOCRATIC 
CHALLENGES FOR THE TERRITORIAL STATE 
This Part discusses the growing fragmentation of the territorially 
based democratic common — frequently, the state — through 
competitive action by cities in response to neo-liberal globalized 
capitalism.  These fragmentations challenge established notions and 
practices of representative democracy, with its underlying egalitarian 
principles in getting one’s voice heard in political decisions.  A 
growing division between cities and metropolitan regions, as most 
likely competitive “winners” and the less successful “rest,” raises 
questions about the fragmenting and, ultimately potentially 
hollowing-out, effect of neo-liberal capitalism.  
Section I.A discusses the ways in which a rising “metropolitanism” 
challenges the territorially defined and expressed “state as shared 
common.”  Section I.B focuses on economic competitiveness as a 
challenger to established public policies, especially in Western 
Europe, to counteract inequalities and thus promote territorial and 
societal cohesiveness of the democratic state.  Finally, Section I.C 
looks more specifically at the fragmenting effect of growing 
competitive individualism, and the impact of such on interest 
representation in a representative democracy. 
A. Metropolitan Individualism, Competitiveness, and the 
Fragmentation of the Democratic Common 
This section looks at the interaction between “metropolitan-ness” 
and competitiveness, and the resulting elitism, as it questions the 
principle of democratic egality within a given territory. 
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“Metropolitan” has become a contested and politically charged 
term,13 insinuating not only elitism and superior opportunities, but 
also political and economic arrogance, vis-à-vis the respective wider 
region and nation-state.  The rise in populist anti-metropolitan 
sentiment is an expression of the underlying, simmering discontent 
and anger about a deepening economic divide between many 
metropolitan “winners” and a lot of non-metropolitan “losers” of 
neo-liberal globalization.  These gaps reflect different degrees of 
engagement with “global flows” of capitalism and the dynamics in 
creating or removing income opportunities with them.14 This sense of 
a shift towards more elitism may create a feeling of losing control and 
relevance, which may lead to estrangement and alienation — 
something referred to by those feeling pushed into such a passive role 
as “being left behind.”15  Differential development results from 
differences in capacity to utilize the effects of globalization to 
individual advantage, which is notable on several levels: first, at the 
global level, between developed and developing countries, with the 
latter blaming the former for unfair practices and structures that put 
them at an inherent disadvantage16; second, at the regional level, 
between clusters of countries, such as the European Union (EU), 
where the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis pitted the North 
against the South17; and third, at the national level, between the 
successful metropolitan regions and the mostly non-urban, peripheral 
“rest” of the state,18 or between struggling old industrial towns or 
cities that seem to have lost their economic raisons d’être.19 
 
 13. See, e.g., Eliane Glaser, In Defence of the Metropolitan Elite, 
NEWSTATESMAN (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/10/defence-metropolitan-elite 
[https://perma.cc/S5S9-8RC6]. 
 14. See generally Manuel Castells, Globalisation, Networking, Urbanisation: 
Reflections on the Spatial Dynamics of the Information Age, 47 URB. STUD. 2737, 
2737–45 (2010). 
 15. Michael Cox, The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Globalisation: Brexit, 
Trump and Beyond, 28 IRISH STUD. INT’L AFF. 9, 9–17 (2017). 
 16. Axel Dreher & Noel Gaston, Has Globalization Increased Inequality?, 16 
REV. INT’L ECON. 516, 516–36 (2008).  On North-South differences, see, e.g., Jean-
Philippe Therien, Beyond the North-South Divide: The Two Tales of World Poverty, 
20 THIRD WORLD Q. 723, 723–42 (1999). 
 17. Peter A. Hall, The Economics and Politics of the Euro Crisis, 21 GERMAN 
POL. 355, 355–71 (2012). 
 18. Larry S. Bourne & Jim Simmons, New Fault Lines? Recent Trends in the 
Canadian Urban System and Their Implications for Planning and Public Policy, 
CANADIAN J. URB. RES. 22, 22–47; see also generally Roberta Capella & Ugo Fratesi, 
Scenarios for European Metropolitan Regions: Winners and Losers in a Globalized 
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Competitiveness, a second factor discussed here, defines spaces of 
economic opportunity. Unlike state territories, these spaces are 
largely virtual, circumscribed by networks of cities that pursue their 
individual metropolitan interests as centers of economic activity and 
competitiveness. The Core Cities network of the ten largest English 
cities is one example.20  They are highly selective in who is included in 
their networks, and who is not, to maximize the advantages of 
collective engagement for the existing network members.  This 
contrasts with conventional state territory as a geographic 
jurisdictional “container,”21 clearly defined by administrative borders 
within which all citizens are subject to the same provisions.  That is 
where the tension arises: While all are equally part of jurisdictional 
territories, only a select number qualify for inclusion in the 
fragmented metropolitan-centric network spaces of enhanced 
competitive opportunity. 
The inherent variability of relationally defined spaces offers the 
opportunity to find, and poses the requirement of finding, appropriate 
responses to quickly changing economic conditions and prospects. 
Equipped with the attribute “new,”22 these spaces have increasingly 
become associated with less formalized alliances around actor 
networks,23 built around shared policy objectives at a particular 
time,24 and “interactive effects” on regional development.25  Space in 
 
World, in METROPOLITAN REGIONS: KNOWLEDGE INFRASTRUCTURES OF THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 195, 195–233 (Johan Klaesson et al. eds., 2013). 
 19. Catherine Thorleifsson, From Coal to Ukip: The Struggle over Identity in 
Post-Industrial Doncaster, 27 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 555, 555–68 (2016). 
 20. For more detail on city networks, see, e.g., TASSILO HERRSCHEL & PETER 
NEWMAN, CITIES AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: URBAN AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
BEYOND THE NATION STATE 76–92 (2017). 
 21. On the notion of “spatial containers,” see, e.g., John Agnew, The Territorial 
Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory, 1 REV. 
INT’L POL. ECON. 53, 53–80 (1994); see also Martin Boisen et al., The Selective 
Nature of Place Branding and the Layering of Spatial Identities, 4 J. PLACE MGMT. & 
DEV. 135, 135–47 (2011). 
 22. See generally Fredrik Söderbaum & Timothy Shaw, Conclusion: What 
Futures for New Regionalism?, in THEORIES OF NEW REGIONALISM: A PALGRAVE 
READER (Fredrik Söderbaum & Timothy Shaw eds., 2003); see also Gordon 
MacLeod & Mark Goodwin, Space, Scale and State Strategy: Rethinking Urban and 
Regional Governance, 23 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 503, 503–27 (1999). 
 23. See, e.g., Andrea Whittle & Andre Spicer, Is Actor Network Theory 
Critique?, 29 ORG. STUD. 612, 614 (2008); Jonathan Murdoch, The Spaces of Actor-
Network Theory, 29 GEOFORUM 357, 357 (1998). 
 24. See generally TASSILO HERRSCHEL, CITIES, STATE AND GLOBALISATION: 
CITY-REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 1–13 (2014). 
 25. Neil M. Coe et al., ‘Globalizing’ Regional Development: A Global Production 
Networks Perspective, 29 TRANSACTIONS INST. BR. GEOGRAPHERS 468, 469 (2004). 
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itself needs to be understood as a “system of relations,”26 rather than 
an a priori defined geographic entity27 potentially offering a 
territorial trap for political analysis.28  It is increasingly important to 
understand inter-actor connections and relations in their reach across 
spatial scales and administrative boundaries.29 
Yet, the reality is that there is a growing divide between some 
metropolitan “winners” with trendy, globalized lifestyles and 
international outlook, and other metropolitan areas, especially those 
having undergone major structural economic changes. Detroit, for 
instance, has become almost symbolic of the latter.  Such selectivity of 
opportunity may be viewed as the result and expression of favoritism 
and elitist arrogance from those outside the metropolitan microcosms. 
From the perspective of these outsiders, the advantages of 
globalization seem less obvious.  It is here that the democratic state 
common becomes fragmented into areas of favoritism and uneven 
“voice” across varying parts of society. 
This discontent suggests that, so far, there has been little success in 
“matching up” the shifting, increasingly fluid, and highly selective 
geographies of variegated economic prospects and successes with 
existing, static, and formally institutionalized state territories.  As a 
result, despite being part of the same territory (e.g., state, region, 
city), there may exist quite considerable differences in de facto 
representation of interests at the political level.  This fundamentally 
contradicts the principle of a Western representative popular 
democracy,30 where “one man—one vote” applies as a necessary 
condition and is the foundation of the legitimacy of the democratic 
state’s territorial and institutional structures and powers.31 
 
 26. DAVID HARVEY, EXPLANATION IN GEOGRAPHY 192 (1969). 
 27. See generally TASSILO HERRSCHEL & PETER NEWMAN, THE GOVERNANCE OF 
EUROPE’S CITY REGIONS: PLANNING, POLICY, AND POLITICS (2002). 
 28. See generally Agnew, supra note 21. 
 29. MICHAEL KEATING, THE NEW REGIONALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE: 
TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING AND POLITICAL CHANGE 82–110 (Edward Elgar ed., 
1998). 
 30. See generally NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES 
AND GENEALOGY (2006). 
 31. STEPHEN J. PURDEY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE GROWTH PARADIGM 56 (2010). 
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B. Competitive Territorial Individualism Versus the Cohesive 
Democratic State 
The interaction between state-territorial structure and agenda-
driven network spaces is shaped by the degree of congruence between 
the two.32  Less congruence suggests greater emphasis on individualist 
interests pursued through networks. Greater congruence suggests two 
scenarios: either a less intensely individualistic push for greater 
competitive advantage, or a stronger presence of state structures that 
could facilitate closer integration with metropolitan initiatives, such as 
international engagement and marketing.  In the latter instances, 
cities’ individual ambitions remain embedded in their wider regional 
and national contexts to produce complementary synergy effects, as 
opposed to producing a growing fragmentation and individualization 
that deepens the divide between perceived winners and losers. 
Structure allows a clear identification between inclusion and 
exclusion of actors and places, based on pre-defined goals, principles, 
and modi operandi, all within clearly defined boundaries.  Such clarity 
is more difficult to achieve for “relations,” as these are inherently 
variable, less visible and predictable, and highly selective.  
Consequently, the forms and extent of inclusions and exclusions vary.  
The geographic ramifications of this complex and potentially 
conflictual interrelationship circumscribe the scope for individual 
actors — citizens, places, and administrations — to gain 
representation of their own interests at the policy-making level.  This 
concept applies across scale, to the position of cities within state 
territories and increasingly dominant nodes of economic and political 
decision-making, and affects the state as a whole.  These network 
relations are both outcomes and originators of a place-focused and 
place-shaped way of linking relevant political, social, and economic 
variables, as structure shapes agency and vice versa. In geographic 
terms, virtual “spaces” are no more than mere spatial backcloths 
underlying urban-centric networks. They are merely illustrative or 
discursively projected. Yet, through their characteristics and qualities, 
they may also act as descriptors of forces shaping such structures.  
The selective nature of actor networks means that being part of such 
a circle suggests increased relevance as actors. Relational relevance is 
thus becoming more important in shaping agendas than simply being 
included based on location on this side or the other of a territorial 
boundary, be that geographically, institutionally, or organizationally.  
 
 32. See generally NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND 
THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD (2004). 
2018] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1207 
Thus, the territorial state essentially presumes the static-ness of 
boundaries and defined territories of responsibility, accountability, 
power, and legitimacy. 
Meanwhile, self-organizing networks are variably connected and 
interactive.  They reach both vertically and horizontally across that 
fixed, formalized arrangement of the state.  The result is inevitably a 
number of gaps and cleavages within and across geographic scales.33  
And it is the ability to bridge these gaps and cleavages that 
determines the efficacy and legitimacy of resulting collaborative 
action and decision-making. 
C. Inequality Under Fragmented Spatial Opportunism? 
Almost twenty years ago, regions, rather than nation-states,34 were 
the main focus of attempts at raising national competitiveness; they 
were understood to be the most effective geographic “unit” for 
framing responses to the challenges of ever-expanding globalization. 
The rise of economic competitiveness is widely understood as being 
attractive to capital investment35 and has near doctrinal status in 
public policy, meaning that challenges to it result in accusations of 
pursuing socialism.36  This debate, especially since the collapse of the 
communist world post-1989, means that the state per se has become 
associated with cumbersome, too-unresponsive, and bureaucratic 
policy-making that inhibits capital investment and growth.  Rescaling 
the state was one answer, but policy-making as such had to change as 
well.37  Opportunity-focused collaborations, informal and temporal, 
appeared better suited to the more differentiated post-”Fordist” 
economy, where small-batch production and market responsiveness, 
 
 33. See Arjen Boin & Paul T. Hart, Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission 
Impossible?, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 544, 545 (2003); see generally Mario Telò, 
Introduction: Globalization, New Regionalism and the Role of the European Union, 
to EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW REGIONALISM (Mario Telo ed., 3d ed. 2016). 
 34. See generally Philip Cooke & Gerd Schienstock, Structural Competitiveness 
and Learning Regions, 1 ENTERPRISE & INNOVATION MGMT. STUD. 265 (2000). 
 35. Roberto Camagni, On the Concept of Territorial Competitiveness: Sound or 
Misleading?, 39 URB. STUD. 2395, 2395–2411 (2002). 
 36. See, e.g., Michael McAuliff & Sara Kenigsberg, Obamacare Is Socialism: 
Reps. Louie Gohmert, Steve King Attack, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2012), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/obamacare-socialism-louie-gohmert-
steve-king_n_1383973.html [https://perma.cc/7CNP-FHPV]. 
 37. See generally BRENNER, supra note 32. 
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and just-in-time principles, have become predominant in shaping 
increasingly individualized and differentiated economics.38 
Scholars are concerned with closing the gap between rigid state 
administrative structures and economically required variability and 
flexibility.  On the one hand, retaining structure avoids “a failure of 
traditional mechanisms” in effectively allocating resources.39  Should 
the necessary flexibility, then, be introduced through collaborative or 
associative forms of governance,40 collective action,41 or collaborative 
institutionalism?42  One conventional response has been repeated 
reorganization of the state.43 This is ultimately futile, given 
organizational and popular resistance to moving administrative 
boundaries and places.44  Instead, existing governmental structures 
may be given the necessary dynamics by linking established structures 
to relational arrangements45 and thus effectively creating state 
structures that are relationally as well as territorially defined. This 
anchoring of the virtual, opportunity-driven, urban-centric network to 
the jurisdictional territory of the democratic state is the crux of 
reconciling the inherent elitism of the former46 with the presumed 
 
 38. Bob Jessop, Post-Fordism and the State, in COMPARATIVE WELFARE SYSTEMS 
165–80 (Bent Greve ed., 1996). 
 39. Simon Zadek, Global Collaborative Governance: There Is No Alternative, 8 
CORP. GOVERNANCE 374, 385 (2008). 
 40. Nicholas A. Phelps & Mark Tewdwr-Jones, Scratching the Surface of 
Collaborative and Associative Governance: Identifying the Diversity of Social Action 
in Institutional Capacity Building, 32 ENV’T & PLAN. A 111, 111–30 (2000). 
 41. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (2015); see also Elinor 
Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global 
Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 551 (2010). 
 42. Patsy Healey, Building Institutional Capacity Through Collaborative 
Approaches to Urban Planning, 30 ENV’T & PLAN. A 1531, 1531–46 (1998). 
 43. Neil Brenner, Open Questions on State Rescaling, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS 
ECON. & SOC’Y 123, 123–39. 
 44. See generally Kaj Zimmerbauer & Anssi Paasi, When Old and New 
Regionalism Collide: Deinstitutionalization of Regions and Resistance Identity in 
Municipality Amalgamations, 30 J. RURAL STUD. 31 (2013). 
 45. See discussion infra Sections II.C, II.E; see generally Colin Flint et al., 
Conceptualizing Conflict Space: Toward a Geography of Relational Power and 
Embeddedness in the Analysis of Interstate Conflict, 99 ANNALS ASS’N AM. 
GEOGRAPHERS 827 (2009). 
 46. See, e.g., ROBERT AGRANOFF & MICHAEL MCGUIRE, COLLABORATIVE 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: NEW STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2004); see 
generally Terry L. Cooper et al., Citizen-Centered Collaborative Public 
Management, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 76 (2006); Michael McGuire, Collaborative 
Public Management: Assessing What We Know and How We Know It, 66 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 33 (2006); Rosemary O’Leary & Nidhi Vij, Collaborative Public 
Management: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going?, 42 AM. REV. PUB. 
ADMIN. 507 (2012). 
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egalitarian political representativeness of the latter.  There is some 
unease in this respect, given the generally less transparent decision-
making structures in collaborative networks, compared to the clear 
role given to citizens in hierarchical state administration structures.47  
For instance, elitism becomes evident in the correlation between 
degree of political recognition and socioeconomic status and success 
when it comes to policy goals and agendas.48 It is this unevenness in 
“voice,” whether actual or perceived, that questions a defining feature 
of democracy: egality among all groups and persons in society.  This 
promise of isonomia to the whole electorate — the demos49 — is the 
primary rationale for the acceptance and functioning of 
representative democracy50 (i.e. the acceptance of the same standing 
in front of the law for all members of society).  Claims of one law for 
the rich and another for the poor suggest that the perception at least 
does not quite reflect that democratic ideal. 
And this perception affects the legitimacy and appropriateness of 
policies and political decisions that derive from any such perceived 
selective consideration of interest, especially as such decisions seem 
to be influenced by outside factors.  The populist, “anti-
establishment” and “anti-metropolitan elite” backlash we are 
currently seeing in many Western democracies attests to that.51  This 
quite clearly exposes the conundrum between pushing for greater 
economic competitiveness, which mostly means a focus on urban 
areas, and the notion of egalitarian democratic representation of all, 
irrespective of their position in the state territory.  It is this very 
egalitarianism in having a voice that provides legitimacy for derived 
political action.  The absence of such egalitarianism, by contrast, may 
imply the absence of legitimacy, as suggested by the new populist 
Right.52 
 
 47. See JAMES BOHMAN, Representation in the Deliberative System, in 
DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AT THE LARGE SCALE 77, 77–
92 (John Parkinson & Jane Mansbridge eds., 2012); Nadia Urbinati, Representation 
as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation, 28 POL. THEORY 758, 758–86 
(2000). 
 48. See generally Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in 
the American States, 40 AM. POL. RES. 29 (2011). 
 49. On the changing position of demos, see generally WENDY BROWN, UNDOING 
THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION (2015). 
 50. See generally URBINATI, supra note 30. 
 51. See generally WILLIAM GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT 
TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018). 
 52. See, e.g., SIMON BORNSCHIER, CLEAVAGE POLITICS AND THE POPULIST RIGHT: 
THE NEW CULTURAL CONFLICT IN WESTERN EUROPE 1–7 (2010); see also Elisabeth 
Ivarsflaten, What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining 
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Part I laid out the central premise of this Article: There exists a 
growing push for urban individualism under the pressures of 
competitive globalized capitalism. The weakening of the state as a key 
actor in structural economic policy has resulted in a growing “cities 
first” mentality. Part II will examine established views of the 
territorial state as a cohesive economic entity, underpinned by 
relevant collective policies. 
II: COMPETITIVE URBAN INDIVIDUALISM VIS-À-VIS COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 
This Part explores both the evidence and consequences of a 
growing gap between the conventional state-territorial perspective 
behind democratic representation, and the role of cities as arenas of 
democratic processes and actors in their own right. 
The discussion is divided into five sections. Section II.A examines 
the growing neo-liberalization of established structural economic 
policies, and thus the acceptance of inequality instead of something to 
be counteracted by the state.  Section II.B links this growing 
individualization to the role and position of cities as competitive 
actors vis-à-vis the territorial democratic state with its underlying 
notion of egality. Section II.C looks at the growing role of informal 
collaborative action between cities to pursue their specific interests en 
face of the nation-state and its institutionalized politics for all its 
territory. Section II.D further discusses cities as a growing elite within 
state territories, and the resulting divisions between those localities 
participating and those not. Finally, Section II.E addresses questions 
of “citi-ness” in democracy: the need to consider the particular role of 
urban elements in democratic processes, and the role of cities in 
connecting local competitive individualism and collectivism of the 
state. 
A. The Urban and the Neo-Liberal State and the Acceptance of 
Regional Inequality 
This section discusses the effect of the rise of neo-liberalism as 
political agenda in the 1990s at the expense of established social 
democratic social market economies, such as in post-war Western 
Europe. State involvement, through government regulation, in 
making the market economy deliver more equitable outcomes within 
national economies in Western Europe, has been an important part of 
 
Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 3, 3 
(2008). 
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the “[p]ost[-]war social contract” between state, capital, and society.53  
Instead, as captured by Fukuyama’s “End of History”54 claim, in the 
face of the collapse of communism, state involvement in capitalism 
was considered counterproductive because it was seen as too socialist.  
This, together with Britain’s push for greater liberalization of the 
European Common Market under the then Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher,55 moved EU economic policy closer to a competitive free 
market agenda. 
The nation-state, with its complex administration and interests, 
seemed ill-suited to effectively address the rapidly changing 
challenges and opportunities produced by globalization.  And so, in 
Europe, the concept of a “Europe of the Regions,” rather than 
nations,56 was advocated by the European Commission as a new 
future framework for international relations. 
The result has been a substantial shift in the EU’s Regional 
Policy57 towards a much more urban-centric and competitiveness-
oriented approach, illustrating the changing focus of politics.  
Implicitly, inequalities were now accepted as a given.  Rather than the 
state trying to incentivize private capital investment to consider less-
than-ideally-competitive locations outside metropolitan areas, the 
greater appeal of urban areas is accepted.  Their prospects in a 
globalized market are to be strengthened as the strongest national 
players, to then benefit the rest of the state territory following the 
neo-liberal trickle-down rationale.58 
 
 53. See, e.g., Leonard Schoppa, Globalization and the Squeeze on the Middle 
Class: Does Any Version of the Postwar Social Contract Meet the Challenge?, in 
SOCIAL CONTRACTS UNDER STRESS: THE MIDDLE CLASSES OF AMERICA, EUROPE, 
AND JAPAN AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 319–20 (Olivier Zunz et al. eds., 2002). 
 54. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST 
MAN (1992). 
 55. See James Ball, The Thatcher Effect: What Changed and What Stayed the 
Same, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/12/thatcher-britain 
[https://perma.cc/JE8M-EWYJ]; Christoph Hermann, Neoliberalism in the European 
Union, 79 STUD. POL. ECON. 61, 75–76 (2007). 
 56. See generally John Loughlin, “Europe of the Regions” and the Federalization 
of Europe, 26 PUBLIUS 141 (1996). 
 57. See Roberto Camagni & Roberta Capello, Macroeconomic and Territorial 
Policies for Regional Competitiveness: An EU Perspective, 2 REGIONAL SCI. POL’Y 
& PRAC. 1, 10 (2010) (“‘[I]ntegrated spatial/urban development policies’ were 
recently indicated by . . . the EU . . . as the consistent new policy approach . . . .”). 
 58. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth 
and Development, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 151, 152 (1997) (discussing theory that 
wealth trickles down “from the rich to the poor” and “leads to a unique steady-state 
distribution of wealth” if capital accumulation is high). 
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The EU’s URBAN program of the late 1990s, and now 
URBACT,59 is a good example of the shift from traditional 
territorially-based redistributive state policies towards selective 
support of cities as best horses in the competitive race for capital 
investment.60  Now, in the face of a growing anti-globalist right-wing 
nationalism in Europe, there is a tentative rediscovery of the virtues 
of the traditional leitbild of EU-wide cohesion in quality of life and 
opportunity as the embodiment of national and European collective 
interest and community.61  Thus, while regions as a territorial whole 
have remained the primary unit of geographic reference for publicly 
declared policies, the growing debates on globalization have 
narrowed the focus on metropolitan centers of de facto policies.62 
Since this shift in perspective, the EU has been trying to square the 
circle between promoting cohesion across its territory as an integral 
part of its founding principles,63 while also following the essentially 
Anglo-Saxon model of neo-liberal, globalized competitiveness with its 
focus on individual achievement. And here, the cities and 
metropolitan areas have emerged as best positioned.64  As a result, 
state territory outside these centers has lost its predominant position 
in the EU’s structural spatial policy agenda.65  In effect, there has 
been a negative trickle down.66 
 
 59. The EU set up URBACT about fifteen years ago to “enable cities to work 
together and develop integrated solutions to common urban challenges . . . .” 
URBACT at a Glance, URBACT, www.urbact.eu/urbact-glance 
[https://perma.cc/956N-BWGZ]. 
 60. Rob Atkinson, The Emerging ‘Urban Agenda’ and the European Spatial 
Development Perspective: Towards an EU Urban Policy?, 9 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 385, 
386–88 (2001). 
 61. See, e.g., Susan S. Fainstein, Competitiveness, Cohesion, and Governance: 
Their Implications for Social Justice, 25 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 884, 885 
(2001) (citing Amsterdam as an example of where there is “practicable possibility” 
that “economic growth and social cohesion can go hand in hand”). 
 62. See Castells, supra note 14, at 2743–44 (discussing contradiction between 
“strong regional or local identity” and concentration of “wealth, power and 
innovation” in metropolitan “mega nodes” that lack “institutional existence”). 
 63. See Fainstein, supra note 61, at 887 (“The continued existence of the 
European national welfare states in the face of ideological assaults on their viability 
demonstrates the possibility of retaining social benefits even within the context of 
heightened global competition.”). 
 64. See Ioannis Chorianopoulos & Theodoros Iosifides, The Neoliberal 
Framework of EU Urban Policy in Action: Supporting Competitiveness and Reaping 
Disparities, 21 LOC. ECON. 409, 419 (2006) (“The neoliberal conceptualisation of EU 
urban policy is based on the belief that ‘harmonious development’ is the result of 
enhanced ‘competitiveness.’”). 
 65. See Michael Kitson et al., Regional Competitiveness: An Elusive yet Key 
Concept?, 38 REGIONAL STUD. 991, 996–97 (2004) (discussing “issue of whether and 
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It is a typical neo-liberal narrative, where the betterment of the 
strong is justified by the expected eventual trickle-down effect to the 
rest.67  But such filtering down requires the willingness of the 
“winners” to let go at least some of their proceeds to the benefit of 
the wider common.  This would mean that cities needed to be put 
back in their places as integral parts of the state territorial geographic 
and political fabric.  But that deprives them of the opportunity of 
becoming more visibly global and playing their best sides to the 
audience.  This expected — and advocated — trickle down has not 
materialized everywhere as promised. Much of it has remained 
confined to metropolitan areas, rather than fanning out into the more 
peripheral areas.  There, this selective effect leads to the recalibration 
of the respective communal space as a reflection of the delicate 
balancing act between competitive standing and being an integral part 
of a state territory.  As it has turned out, the gap between “winners 
take all” and the “losers” of this head-on competitiveness has never 
been wider across the world.68  And it is the resulting disaffection, 
frustration, and anger that have supported a new nationalist, 
protectionist and anti-globalist, populist agenda across the Western 
world. 
Discussions about global cities69 and their pivotal role in the new 
“network society,”70 where network relations are the basis of a 
society and not so much shared territory and physical proximity, 
reflect the dominant narratives at this time.  Large, internationally 
 
how far policy should focus on particular localities within the region rather than on 
others” and European Commission’s recognition of the need for “reduc[ing] of 
spatial socio-economic inequalities”). 
 66. See Richard P.F. Holt & Daphne T. Greenwood, Negative Trickle-Down and 
the Financial Crisis of 2008, 46 J. ECON. ISSUES 363, 363–64 (2012) (defining 
“negative trickle-down” as the flow of economic growth “increasingly to the very 
top,” accompanied by “negative externalities that diminish financial well-being”). 
 67. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 58, at 151 (describing trickle-down as a 
“widely believed” theory). 
 68. Robert Hunter Wade, Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?, 34 
INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 381, 403–04 (2004) (presenting studies suggesting “world 
income inequality has been rising during the past two to three decades” and 
challenging World Bank’s poverty numbers); see also Micaela di Leonardo, New 
Global and American Landscapes of Inequality, in NEW LANDSCAPES OF 
INEQUALITY: NEOLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3–4 
(Jane L. Collins et al. eds., 2008) (highlighting “proliferating array of markers of 
human misery” amid “the rise of neoliberal globalization”). 
 69. See generally Saskia Sassen, Whose City Is It? Globalization and the 
Formation of New Claims, 8 PUB. CULTURE 205 (1996). 
 70. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, in THE INFORMATION AGE: 
ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (2d ed. 2009). 
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operating cities71 have thus increasingly moved to the center ground 
politically and economically. These cities have been encouraged by 
national governments to do so,72 in the quest for greater economic 
success for the whole of the wider region and state as the expected 
outcome. 
The Europe-wide Eurocities network73 is one such “elite” 
international project by leading European cities to raise their profile 
and emancipate themselves from their respective nation-states as 
“masters.”  This involved less institutionalized, and thus less binding, 
forms of collaborative regionalism, driven by opportunistic 
considerations by each collaborator.74  However, such self-selection 
processes mean that not all urban players or other spatial entities, are 
equal in their scope and capacity to engage, or being invited to 
engage, by others.  The reason is that they may not have to offer the 
qualities sought, and thus advantages available, that promise win-win 
outcomes for all those actors engaged in a network.  But that matters 
as the primary appeal of building and joining a self-selecting policy 
network, where collaboration is to bring more advantages to each 
participant than “going it alone.”  So, the strong will seek the strong, 
thus reinforcing underlying inequalities in opportunities by gaining 
political weight in national and regional politics. 
 
 71. MICHELLE ACUTO, GLOBAL CITIES, GOVERNANCE AND DIPLOMACY: THE 
URBAN LINK 96–97 (2012) (noting “global cities” are “at the heart of today’s world 
affairs” and “play a key role in changing some of [international politics’] essential 
parameters”); see also HERRSCHEL & NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 1–2  (describing 
how cities are becoming “actors in their own right . . . in international policy-making 
and governance”). 
 72. See, e.g., Allan D. Wallis, Regions in Action: Crafting Regional Governance 
Under the Challenge of Global Competitiveness, 85 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 15, 17 (1996) 
(citing a survey of a dozen regions whose “governments are actively working” toward 
“modernization” and “convert[ing] their cities into beacons, leading their nations”). 
 73. GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER: PLACING SCALE, 1–14 (Andrew Herod & Melissa 
W. Wright eds., 2002). See also About Eurocities, EUROCITIES, 
http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/about [https://perma.cc/336R-YST7].  In 1986, six 
cities set up the Eurocities network, but now over 130 members (plus forty partner 
cities) are part of the network. HERRSCHEL & NEWMAN, supra note 20, at 84.  These 
cities cite “an explicit mission to achieve formal roles in the EU’s ‘multi-level’ policy 
processes.” Id. 
 74. See Michael Keating, Regions and International Affairs: Motives, 
Opportunities and Strategies, 9 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 1, 13 (1999) (citing 
examples of “practical problems . . . in efforts to secure inter-regional collaboration” 
in Canada, France, Spain, and Belgium); see also KEATING, supra note 29, at 16. Cf. 
MacLeod & Goodwin, supra note 22, at 511 (“[In] integrated policy communities . . . 
individual departments pursue their own autonomy, albeit within overall 
governmental constraints.”). 
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Thus, unevenness becomes de facto an accepted reality, where 
shadow effects of such urban-centric individualism may mean a 
marginalization of non-urban and non-participating actors — places, 
territories, institutions, organizations, or individuals.  Their voices 
may become obscured, even drowned out, by the urban nodes of 
connectivity and growing political and economic pre-eminence 
coupled to their global economic success.75  The cities and their 
economic engagement have thus been leading to the recalibration of 
the respective communal space, a reflection of the delicate balancing 
act between competitive standing and being an integral part of the 
state territory. 
Neo-liberalism has grown as a dominant doctrine in economic 
policy since the late 1980s.  The end of the bi-polar world gave added 
impetus to acceptance of individualist competitiveness as the “only 
show in town.” Even stalwarts of state intervention in economic 
development to counteract structural inequalities, such as the EU, 
have succumbed to the neo-liberal rationale. The result has been a 
general acceptance of inequality as a matter of fact, and the belief 
that success can only be achieved by sending out the strongest players 
to globalized capitalism: the already successful cities and city regions. 
B. Cities and Governing the Complexity of Space with Territory 
This section explores the possible roles cities and metropolitan 
areas may adopt in using their key positions as linchpins of both 
virtual collaborative network spaces and the state territories of which 
they are an integral part. 
Metropolitan areas are, thus, in a crucial position to develop 
governance mechanisms that address the gap between 
competitiveness-defined spaces and cohesive state territories.  
Governing virtual or “soft” spaces,76 such as network-defined spaces, 
is likely to resemble a complex patchwork of negotiated and 
renegotiated compromise arrangements among a group of actors self-
selecting around a shared agenda.  The outcome is a complex, 
continuously revised and rearranged self-organizing web of 
opportunistic inter-relations and connections, as reflected in the 
 
 75. See Castells, supra note 14, at 2743–44. 
 76. Cormac Walsh, Rethinking the Spatiality of Spatial Planning: Methodological 
Territorialism and Metageographies, 22 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 306, 308, 309, 322 (2014) 
(drawing distinction between “hard spaces” that refer to “existing institutional 
geographies” and “soft spaces” that refer to “relational understanding of place and 
space”). 
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concept of governance — in contrast to conventional, state actor-
centric government. 
The concept of governance provides the opportunity to look at 
networks from both a political-administrative perspective 77 and the 
angle of traditional state hierarchical organization.78  Their respective 
geographic expressions follow the dichotomy between spatially 
variable and institutionally “light” networks on the one hand, and the 
vertically organized, nested territorial state on the other.79  The reach 
of such interest-defined, and thus actor-selective, networks vaguely 
defines the boundaries of such variable, virtual space.80 
This contrast becomes evident in public planning as a main 
instrument of the state’s intervention for the collective interest: 
Communicative planning81 adds a new, dynamic, time-dependent, and 
geographically “soft”82 component to traditional planning with its 
longer-term, territorially fixed, and prescriptive nature.  Rather than 
being bureaucratically prescriptive, the focus is on consensus-based 
strategy making.83  And this, at least in principle, offers access to, and 
participation in, a broader coalition of interests and voices than 
 
 77. R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Ten Years On, 28 ORG. STUD. 
1243, 1246 (2007); see generally JONATHAN S. DAVIES, CHALLENGING GOVERNANCE 
THEORY: FROM NETWORKS TO HEGEMONY (2011). 
 78. Compare Ian Bache & Matthew Flinders, Multi-Level Governance and the 
Study of the British State, 19 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 31, 33–34 (2004) (juxtaposing the 
traditional Westminster model of government with multi-level government) with 
Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: 
From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, 39 BRIT. J POL. SCI. 1, 2–3 
(2009) (advocating post-functionalist, multi-level view of governance, given trend 
toward regional integration). 
 79. Neil Brenner, Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial 
Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales, 16 ENV’T & PLAN. D 
459, 466 (1998). 
 80. Tassilo Herrschel, Network Regionalism, Development Agencies and 
Peripheralisation Through ‘Loss of Voice,’ in MOVING TOWARDS POST-
REGIONALISM? 172–86 (Nicola Bellini et al. eds., 2012); Tassilo Herrschel, 
Regionalisation and Marginalisation: Bridging Old and New Regional Divides, in 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN EUROPE: PERIPHERALITY, MARGINALITY 
AND BORDER ISSUES 38 (Mike Danson & Peter de Souza eds., 2012). 
 81. Patsy Healey, Relational Complexity and Imaginative Power of Strategic 
Spatial Planning, 14 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 525, 542–43 (2006); see, e.g., Phil 
Allmendinger & Graham Haughton, Soft Spaces, Fuzzy Boundaries, and 
Metagovernance: The New Spatial Planning in the Thames Gateway, 41 ENV’T & 
PLANNING A 617, 618–19 (2009) (describing “relational geography of planning” 
employed for the Thames Gateway). 
 82. See Walsh, supra note 76, at 306–08. 
 83. See Jesse Heley, Soft Spaces, Fuzzy Boundaries and Spatial Governance in 
Post-Devolution Wales, 37 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 1325, 1327–28 (2012). 
2018] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1217 
conventional institutional procedures through hierarchical 
arrangements. 
Such opening up raises questions about the form of inter-
relationships84 between these two principles of geographic 
organization — structure and fluidity.  In an ideal scenario, both 
geographies may be congruent, producing a near-perfect match 
between like-minded and like-interested self-organizing 
“togetherness,” and an a priori prescribed territorial organization of 
power, responsibility, and representative democratic legitimacy.  In 
most cases, however, this congruence between the two layers is less 
than perfect, showing an only partial, or fragmented, match.  Being 
part of a state territorial unit does not automatically mean 
participating in decision-making and policy-influencing networks. 
This inherent selectivity matters, given the growing economic 
relevance and political reality of the network spaces formed for 
enhanced competitive prospects under globalization.  The result is 
growing tensions between the territorially-based possibility to express 
political choices (e.g., through elections) that are then translated into 
public policy decisions, and the economic reality of highly selective, 
increasingly metropolitan-centric, investment decisions in a neo-
liberal, competitive setting. 
Because of these tensions, any public policy outcomes that are 
ultimately achieved may not be recognizable in formally and publicly 
visible ways.  Here, the current “anti-elite” populism finds its raison 
d’être: a growing sense of disempowerment or remoteness from 
actual decision-making processes that begets a sense of lost voice.85  
The main clusters of influential decision-making networks inevitably 
remain concentrated in the metropolitan areas; therefore, democratic 
principles and choices may seem, to those on the fringes, less relevant 
for the shaping of actual decision-making processes and the 
distribution of economic opportunities. 
State territories are thus no longer able to provide a consistent and 
continuous reference point of certainty.  The borders and territories 
they define give way to diffuse, virtual spaces of competitive 
opportunity which are inherently open, held together by temporary 
coordination of shared interest rather than formalized alliances and 
 
 84. See infra Sections II.C, II.E; see Flint et al., supra note 45, at 829–30 
(discussing “multiple geographies” of “relative physical location” and “positions with 
networks of relationships”). 
 85. Eva Sørensen, Democratic Theory and Network Governance, 24 ADMIN. 
THEORY & PRAXIS 693, 698 (2002). 
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programs.86  The underlying driver is, in essence, individual (local, 
regional national and personal) self-interest, rather than an 
appreciation of the bigger picture.  In other words, relations among 
actors are primarily driven by the perceived individual benefits for 
each of the network members that will result from engagement in 
such collaborative arrangements. 
Actors may join, leave, or regroup in pursuit of their changing 
interests and circumstances, thus producing shifting “geograph[ies] of 
centrality and marginality”87 through reflexive networks.88  Such 
networks consciously adapt to external challenges.  The consequence 
is a diverse range of new strategic directions for cities and regions, 
which emerge from within as they seek to further their priorities and 
agendas individually or through collaborative alliances.  These clearly 
distinguish between those actors that are beneficial for furthering the 
network and those that are not.  There is no participation by mere 
association, such as sharing a fixed, institutionalized territorial entity 
of a region or state.  No longer is there a general, inclusive safety net 
of contiguous territory, when it comes to the pursuit of development 
opportunity.  Instead, competitiveness and connectedness rely on the 
success of individual places.  Here, cities and city regions are — 
generally — in a better position than the non-metropolitan rest. 
And so, less attractive actors, deemed too much of a risk and 
ballast for a network, are left to fend for themselves.  They may either 
remain excluded or need to find other willing partners of similar 
limited attraction to boost their equally limited capacity and 
opportunities as an alliance of the weak(er).  Not being part of such a 
“relational web”89 threatens to reinforce existing relational 
peripheralization and marginalization.  Such may be read as failure to 
make the grade for being considered good enough for inclusion in a 
network of enhanced competitiveness and thus opportunity, setting in 
train a reinforcing negative momentum. 
One solution to this growing selective fragmentation could be to 
ensure that all state territories are captured by the forming of relevant 
opportunity spaces, or spaces circumscribed by a group of 
opportunity-chasing collaborative actors.  Traditionally, this has been 
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attempted through active state intervention, such as infrastructure 
investment to raise the competitiveness of the more peripheral 
areas.90  This occurs within metropolitan areas, with marginalized 
neighborhoods and suburbs, or outside cities, with semi-urban and 
rural areas away from the main city regions. 
By contrast, another way may be a less expensive, discursive, or 
“imagineered”91  production of cohesiveness, which may serve 
primarily more superficial and immediate political agendas.  Yet, the 
state needs to be willing to take on a more active role in shaping its 
territorial development based on politically and democratically 
agreed agendas.  This deviates from the neo-liberal mantra of the 
minimal state being the most economically effective.  Some form of 
dirigisme may well enhance competitiveness by broadening the range 
of potentially successful actors or places.  The result may be greater 
variety, innovativeness, and dynamic than a mere pursuit of the 
survival of the fittest.  The subsequent costs may well exceed the 
seeming initial benefits. 
C.  Collaborative Governance as Undermining of Practical 
Democracy 
Governance as a concept evolved out of the growing diffusion of 
power structures and decision-making since the rise of competitive 
globalism with its neo-liberal underpinning.92  R.A.W. Rhodes, 
Professor of Government at the University of Southampton, describes 
governance as characterized by variable institutional and territorial 
boundaries, goal-defined actor networks, and a degree of autonomy 
from the state, all of which point to the inherent “fuzziness”93 of the 
concept.94  Important here is the specified autonomy of the state.  
This push for governing independence points to the growing gap 
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between the institutionalized state and actual decision-making 
structures and processes.  For a democratic state, it is the gap between 
representational popular legitimacy derived from the citizenry of all 
its territory, and the degree to which these interests are translated 
into political processes and developments, that at least questions 
comparable opportunities across its owned territory. 
It is this growing gap that reflects a “redefined basis of 
accountability.”95  This, in turn, causes frustration and raises 
questions about the quality of democratic representation and the 
balance between individual, elite, and general civic interests.  Indeed, 
some theorists of democracy critique neo-liberally characterized 
democracies as “defective,”96 “post-representative,”97 post-
democratic,98 or mere façades.99  It is a claim used by the anti-
democratic populists who accuse democratic systems of being no 
more than establishment or elite projects.100 
The focus of critique rests in the role of civil society in shaping 
political choices: Who calls the shots? It is here that transition theory, 
with its focus on democratization, makes the main distinction 
between a formal democracy—institutionally democratic on paper 
only — and a practiced, actually existing democracy, which involves 
popular interest representation in political power.101 
The ways in which collaborative government comes about 
determine its degree of openness for interest representation (i.e. 
autonomy from the state).  Collaborative arrangements organized 
top-down via governmental fiat are more state-centric and formally 
incorporated into state administrative hierarchies — effectively part 
of the state machinery and its institutionalized procedures.  By 
contrast, collaborations shaped bottom up, through self-organizing 
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mechanisms either among neighboring municipalities,102 or between 
like-interested metropolises of similar standing and appeal —such as 
the mentioned world cities — are deliberate attempts to break out of 
the confines of their state contexts.103  It is a step to boost the own 
positions vis-à-vis the state and thus an attempt to gain more 
autonomy from it.  Globalization and derived pressures for increased 
economic competitiveness are the main drivers behind such 
collaboration.104 
This greater autonomy from state governing structures affects, for 
instance, the range of actors considered eligible for participation in 
political processes and the ultimate purpose of collaborative efforts.  
Such efforts may aim to merely gain efficiencies in service delivery 
and administration, as under new public management.105 Or, they 
may seek to broaden civic involvement by widening the range of 
involved governmental and non-governmental, public and private, 
actors with their diverse agendas.  Though balancing interests 
becomes more complex and challenging, this strengthens the 
legitimacy and acceptance of political decisions and policy 
implementation.  Consequently, it becomes more difficult to devalue 
such policies as mere elite projects serving elite interests. 
However, willingness and capacity to do so vary, reflecting 
particular regional and national circumstances and political cultures 
with varying balances between individual and collective interests.  It is 
here that any striving efforts for more autonomy from the state, to 
make political choices to maximize development opportunities, find 
their limitations.106 
D. Cities as Elites in Democratic States 
Inter-actor relationships, such as between cities, sit within varying 
place-specific contexts as external milieu.  They are composites of 
particular societal values, political agendas, state structures, and 
scalar allocations of power, as well as historic experiences and 
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political-economic structures.107  They circumscribe scope and 
capacity for, but also interest in, “actorness” which means assuming a 
proactive stance in decision-making.108  For localities, this includes a 
willingness to participate in governance at the city-regional level, 
though it may also mean building and joining networks.  Democratic 
action may thus be viewed as doubly embedded: (1) internally, in the 
functional arrangements and systemic interdependencies of the 
different composite elements of a democratic regime, or (2) 
externally, as embedded in the broader preconditions for democracy. 
These conditions may be supportive or obstructive.109  Internal 
embeddedness involves the statutory position of municipalities within 
the state hierarchy.  This, in turn, circumscribes the scope for 
independent action, and more generally, perceptions of the expected 
role of the state in public policy by the individual citizen.  External 
embeddedness, meanwhile, involves the processes of globalization, 
and the working of global capitalism vis-à-vis the state and its 
regulatory capacity. 
Negotiating and finding a win-win outcome for all concerned is the 
raison d’être of all self-organizing collaborative engagement and 
action per se, as likely negative outcomes are a disincentive.  
Engagement can be justified as part of a local apolitical program only 
if the gain is greater through collaboration than through independent 
action.  Even if orchestrated by the state, the willingness and 
enthusiasm to effect policy outcomes depends on the expected 
individual advantage.  Pressures to demonstrate added value are 
likely to be greater in self-organizing collaborative networks because 
there the proposed benefits of engagement are the primary 
justification of departing from well-established, familiar structural 
procedures.  It is this pressure to achieve positive outcomes that is 
both a strength and a weakness of informal collaborative action.  For 
instance, lines of responsibility and legitimation of action under an 
informal system are not as clear as they are under a hierarchical, 
formalized, and institutionalized system.  There is also a danger that 
the results justifying the means may lead to decisions later challenged 
by those to whom the outcomes seem less clearly beneficial. 
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This conflict is referred to as the relationship between the 
individual and the commons, and it requires modes of governance 
that can reconcile the differing respective perspectives and appraisals 
of advantage.110  Applied here, the conflict juxtaposes local 
individuality in the form of municipal self-governance, with a city-
regional common made up of neighboring municipalities.  This 
common city region is linked to the local individual through expected 
advantages for the participating individual municipalities from 
collective action.  Such individuality refers not just to locality as a 
whole, but also institutional, organizational, or personal interests and 
considerations, as they consider the costs and benefits of collaborative 
action.111  For example, municipalities may pursue a regional agenda 
as part of a strategic move to promote their individual local interests 
through collective action, rather than simply scale up such activities to 
the regional level as a separate tier of framing and legitimizing 
policies.  This would be seen as a transfer of power and responsibility, 
and thus a local loss of policy-making capacity. 
Giving the region an economic value in its own right involves 
considering the commonality of interests among the collaborators so 
that there is a sense of natural shared purpose and, in return, 
individually beneficial outcomes of their collective action.112 
Urbanization and its relevance to state-territorial referencing of 
democratic concepts113 reveal a gap between urban theory, on the one 
hand, and theory of democracy and democratization, on the other.114  
Critical and radical urban theory focuses on the link between the city, 
as an expression of collective functionality, and the individual.115  In 
so doing, it focuses on the consideration of collective interests116 and 
accessibility of urban spaces, as a matter of spatial justice.117  The city 
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is thus construed as an arena in which social structures are manifested 
and acted out for influence on, and participation in, city life.118  It is 
thus a distinct social and societal focus, which has repeatedly followed 
Marxist analyses and borrowed from structural theory.119  This theory 
focuses in particular on a critique of neo-liberalism as dominant 
discourse and the uneven outcomes it produces for citizens within and 
outside of cities.  And this, in turn raises fundamental questions 
around accountability and justice of relevant policy decisions.120 
Democratic theory focuses on questions of representation, the role 
of the demos in shaping and controlling power,121 and neo-liberal 
economics as part of the Western model of liberal market democracy, 
with its expected natural production of social justice across spatial 
scales through trickle down.122 This theoretical map can be applied to 
the relationship between individual localities —be they urban or not 
— and state territories as an expression of the collective sum of all 
places in a state. 
Critical democratic theory addresses the distinction between city 
and state political geographies by pointing to the differences in 
representative and communicative democracy, respectively.123  In the 
latter, connectivity, and thus access to institutions, power, and 
influence, matters.124  In other words, the normative notions of 
legitimacy are of primary interest, based on universal representation 
versus selective engagement as a means for gaining greater political 
efficacy.  The question is how theoretical and actually experienced 
expressions of democracy are negotiated and become anchored to 
particular structures and histories. 
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For democratic engagement, identity and sense of belonging are 
important factors in pinpointing the relevant territorial reference, be 
it the nation-state or a region or city with distinct identities.  For 
instance, collaborative regionalism draws on municipal entities which, 
as building blocks of the democratic state, are also important 
democratic spaces of demos 
 and legitimacy of political processes, such as local elections and 
councils.  Municipal entities, in pursuit of their specific local agendas, 
provide the basis for more varied, detailed and individually 
responsive policies.  This greater variety in policy responses and 
strategies takes into account an increasingly detailed variety in 
circumstances, potentials, and interests of places than is possible at 
the more aggregate conventional territorial approach with a more 
uniform policy implementation down the political hierarchy.  
Likewise, further up the spatial scale, inherently elitist 
cosmopolitanism faces pressures for recognizing, and responding to, 
transnational justice in income and opportunity, and needs to adjust 
in imaginative, individualized ways to meet criticism.125 
Importantly, cities and metropolitan areas have gained twofold: 
first, as competitive economic and political actors, and second, as 
platforms for, and expressions of, democratic representation.  This 
has added complexity to the democratic state, as it highlights, and 
offers the opportunity to articulate, differing interests, perspectives, 
and priorities within the territory-based democracy of states and 
regions.  This, in turn, challenges notions of a territorial uniformity 
and the capacity to formulate democratic response. 
E. Democracy and “Citi-ness” 
This section focuses on the need for a more city-shaped form of 
democratic policy making. The notion of “citi-ness” seeks to capture 
the particular characteristics of city-based societal interests and 
political processes. This, re-calibrates the understanding of 
democratic principles away from the one-size-fits-all territorial model. 
Factors like political historic legacies, experiences, and cultures do 
not feature much in the territorial model of the state.  Rather, the 
state is understood as a territorial black box, with no further 
distinctions beyond the overall visibly territorial and institutional 
characteristics.126  There is much less interest in internal territorial 
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variations, such as differences between urban and non-urban spaces 
in experiencing and shaping democracy.  Does the difference between 
“urban” and “non-urban” matter?  In urban critical theory, the city is 
the primary lens as a given spatial platform, on which different 
interests and power structures in society manifest themselves 
physically. 
In urban theory, the city is a given as the primary focus of interest.  
Consequently, there is much less discussion about the possible 
functioning of such theory in a non-urban setting.  This suggests an 
automatic implicit assumption that it is the urban places that 
matter.127  Cities are the particular and relevant political arenas.  
Meanwhile, in democratic theory, “citi-ness”128 plays little role as a 
particular factor.  “The state” as a concept does not know such 
distinction.  It is therefore difficult for either analysis to address the 
intricacies between metropolitanization, where cities are favored 
objects by post-structuralist theories of globalization, and debates on 
democratic principles, where the state is primarily an institutional 
entity with a uniform territorial expression. 
Yet the spatial dimension matters too, as it creates different 
layered identities and begets the perception that there are differing 
degrees of “affectedness” by certain political issues.129 “Affectedness” 
thus means being affected by the processes and policy decisions of 
others, and thus is inherently about passivism.  What is the scope to 
turn this passivism into agency, formulate a response, and thus shape 
the ways in which affectedness works? The greater the gap between 
passive and active, the greater the sense of political impotence and 
being a mere leaf in the wind of wider processes. 
This sense of being reduced to a mere passive role has resulted in 
the current boost to populist nationalism and inward-looking politics 
which we can observe in Europe and the U.S.130  This fundamentally 
contradicts the role and nature of democratic principles and thus 
corrodes democratic values.  The retreat of this political faction into 
itself has been borne of the distinction between “metropolitanism” 
and “the rest,” with the associated values of left-leaning, 
internationalist, and diverse in the former, and conservative, often 
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inward-looking in the latter with a penchant for authoritarian 
leadership as benevolent ‘father’ of the whole nation. 
Networks are about power games,131 generally focused around 
specific, single objectives (“issue networks”).132  They include a 
growing localization – or, rather, metropolitanization – of the regional 
scale of governance.133  And this results in an effective, albeit 
administratively invisible, dissection of the territorially fixed entity 
‘region’ into temporary, policy-driven, local groupings, where 
regionalization is a merely incidental outcome of inter-local 
collaboration.  The result has been a dynamization of territory 
towards a continuously changing patchwork of relationally-defined 
and opportunity-driven policy spaces.134  The nature of these spaces 
thus effectively has added a perception of a geography that sits next 
to a conventional understanding of hierarchical state territoriality and 
its organizational principles. 
Underneath these virtual, relationally-defined, geographic entities 
lie established governmental territories with clearly defined and 
institutionally-backed powers, fiscal and statutory responsibilities, 
and democratic legitimacies.  It is through these established 
governmental territories that inherently self-selective network spaces 
can become effective on the ground: by being “anchored” to existing 
structures.135  And these most salient anchor points are more likely to 
take hold in cities than the functionally less connected and influential 
“rest” of a territory.  How this “anchoring” can work in practice 
varies depending on each city’s particular circumstances136, thus 
circumscribing their capacity to negotiate, their tensions, and their 
contestations.  The example presented here illustrates this complex 
relationship between, fixed and democratically legitimating state-
administrative territoriality and, selective, often invisible, network-
defined and virtual spatiality. The conventional, administrative 
Region Skåne in southern Sweden exemplifies the former, the 
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Øresund Region (now rebranded as Greater Copenhagen and Skåne) 
illustrates the latter. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL ØRESUND REGION: METROPOLITAN-
DEFINED SPACE INTERSECTS WITH STATE-DEFINED TERRITORY 
Region Skåne in southern Sweden (Figure 1) remains a fascinating 
example of multiple regionalisms overlapping and intersecting – those 
that are territorially fixed, equitable in terms of democratic 
representation, and institutionalized as part of the hierarchical state, 
and those that are projected as more or less virtual, discursive spaces 
underpinning self-organizing urban networks in the pursuit of specific 
shared interests. The beginning of constructing discursively the 
Øresund Region was the opening of the fixed link Øresund Bridge in 
2000, which fundamentallychanged the relational dynamics in the 
Danish-Swedish regional space.137 
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Figure 1: Øresund Region: Selective Metropolitanization and 
Exclusion of the “Rest Region” of Skåne 
 
Source: Based on a prior version of an outline map by Lund 
University. All contents added by the author. 
 
Until the bridge opening, economically, the border had been 
somewhat “like an Iron Curtain.”138  The opening has become the 
main driver of changing spatial relationships – whether experienced, 
advocated, or perceived.  Two relationships interact: (1) regions as 
cohesive territorial parts of the hierarchically-ordered state, defined 
by clear boundaries, including the physical separation by the Øresund 
Strait along the international border between Sweden and Denmark; 
and (2) regions as a fragmented, non-contiguous outcome of selective, 
self-organizing, inter-municipal collaboration, with a distinct 
metropolitan or urban focus.  The latter type region aims to boost 
international visibility to attract presumed footloose global capital by 
emphasizing the advantages that stem from complementarity of 
location factors in the two countries. 
Section III.A looks at the Øresund Region as a constructed space 
based around expected increased competitive opportunities. Section 
III.B discusses the growing division between the central role of the 
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main grouping of cities and the marginalising effect of this for the rest 
of the wider geographic region of Skåne. Section III.C discusses the 
crucial role of cities as potential connectors between variable and 
essentially elitist collaborative spaces of competition within the 
territorial collectivity of the democratic state. It is this second role 
that is only beginning to be identified as part of the growing questions 
about the relationship between globalized capitalism and principles of 
egalitarian representation in a democratic state. And it is around this 
that the current discussions about the Øresund Region between 
Region Skåne and Greater Copenhagen have essentially revolved. 
The inherent conundrum has not quite been solved yet, as the rather 
cumbersome, bolted-together name ‘Greater Copenhagen and 
Region Skåne’ suggests. 
A.  The Øresund Region as Technologically Enabled and 
Economically Driven International Opportunity Space 
The Øresund Region as a discursive marketing project has been 
substantially shaped by its main cities in both Denmark and Sweden, 
facing each other across the sea.  Conventional regionalism, such as 
sub-national state territories, is represented through the formalized 
Capital City Region (Hovedstaden) in Denmark and Region Skåne in 
Sweden.  In Sweden, like all Swedish regions, Region Skåne’s main 
task is the distribution of public services, especially health care.139  
Since 2010, Skåne, as a pilot project of limited regional devolution, 
gained some greater degree of autonomy, including economic 
development, as test cases for devolving responsibilities to the 
regional level.140 
The region remains a creature of the central state.  Most of its cities 
are concentrated along the western coastline,141 with the rest being 
characterized by expansive rural areas with a scattering of villages 
and a few small market towns.  Skåne thus shows a clear functional 
geographic division between an urban western coast and a largely 
rural rest.  This contrast has been brought to the fore by the public 
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and political discussion around the Øresund Region as a political and 
economic spatial construct.142  The result was a perceived, even if 
formally invisible, separation into those municipalities that 
considered themselves part of this new discursive space of 
internationality and competitiveness, and those that quite clearly feel 
not part of this new space.143  This has resulted in the latter’s further 
sense of marginalization and peripheralization and loss of voice.  A 
sense of political unease and even frustration followed with the 
seemingly de facto division between first and second-class 
municipalities within Skåne, when it comes to having a voice in 
shaping regional matters. 
The concept of the discursive Øresund region as a spatial image 
follows the rationale of network-based, relationally defined “new” 
regions— essentially opportunistic, based on a shared agenda, and 
collaborative for a select group of actors whose participation defines 
the spatial extent of the region.  Globalization, and the growing focus 
on competitiveness by the EU in the 2000s, have been key drivers of 
this development.144  The geographically neutral, non-descript name 
of the concept region is per se an expression of the underlying rivalry 
between the main cities, especially the largest three, Copenhagen, 
Malmö and Lund. And then there are national sensitivities on the 
Swedish side, mainly in Stockholm and outside the Skåne Region, 
towards being ‘subsumed’ under the name of Greater Copenhagen, 
the capital of Denmark.145  Against this, there has been a recent 
remarkable complete volte-face, that reflects shifting political 
interests vis-à-vis rapidly changing economic realities.  In 2016, 
following pressure from Copenhagen to have a stronger visibility of 
 
 142. See Interview, Official, Region Skåne Administration, in Region Skåne (Jan. 
10, 2013) (unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with author); 
Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, in Lund Town Hall, City of Lund 
(Dec. 12, 2013) (unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with 
author). 
 143. See Interview with Official, Ystad, Southeast Skåne Region Organization, in 
Southeast Skåne Region (May 20, 2014) (unnamed interviewee to preserve 
anonymity) (notes on file with author).  For a more general discussion of 
international political spaces, see, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL 
SPACES AND BORDER CROSSINGS 15–16 (James Anderson ed., 2002). 
 144. See Interview with Official, Øresund Committee, supra note 138. 
 145. These sensitivities go back to the times when Skåne was Danish until about 
300 years ago, as was repeatedly pointed out in interviews. See id.; see, e.g., Interview 
with Official, Øresund Committee, supra note 138. 
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its name to boost international recognition, the name of the Øresund 
Region was changed to “Greater Copenhagen and Skåne.”146 
This reflects the outcome of a general disillusionment on the 
Danish side – mainly in Copenhagen – with the lukewarm support for 
further collaboration in Sweden, and a greater emphasis on 
traditional state-sponsored regionalism.  One of the reasons has been 
a distrust of Stockholm, some 500 kilometers away, in favor of a close 
relationship with Denmark and a growing economic integration of a 
Swedish peripheral part (as seen from the capital) with an economic 
corridor reaching from Oslo, via Gothenburg, to Hamburg.147  Within 
the Øresund region, dealing with Copenhagen at a local level is no 
problem at all, whereas a bit further away Copenhagen is viewed 
primarily as a foreign capital.148 
But also at a more regional level, political temperature has varied 
between Copenhagen’s and Malmö’s city leadership in the early 
2010s,149 when a change in Copenhagen’s mayoralty meant a more 
sceptical view of the likely benefits of engaging with the eastern 
neighbor.150  Copenhagen’s interest focused on the urban centres, 
especially Malmö as the largest and most accessible city on the 
Swedish side, and there is a strong duopoly of interests, including 
plans for an undersea metro line.151  Through this closer cooperation, 
the two cities have practically left the rest even of the Øresund region 
behind, manifesting a threefold core-periphery order: (1) the Malmö-
Copenhagen duopoly, (2) followed by the virtual Øresund Region, 
and (3) the rest of Region Skåne. 
The re-projecting and re-branding of the Øresund Region as 
Greater Copenhagen and Skåne is an attempt to respond to 
Copenhagen’s pressure to have its leading – and internationally more 
visible – position recognized more clearly. But there is also Skåne’s 
 
 146. See Interview with City Official, Mayor’s Office, in City of Helsingborg (Apr. 
19, 2018) (unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with author). 
 147. See id.; see also Interview, City Official, Invest in Skåne, Region Skåne 
Administration, in City of Malmö (May 21, 2014) (unnamed interviewee to preserve 
anonymity) (notes on file with author). 
 148. See Interview with City Official, Invest in Skåne, Region Skåne 
Administration, supra note 147. 
 149. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142; see 
Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142. 
 150. See Interview with City Official, Invest in Skåne, Region Skåne 
Administration, supra note 147. 
 151. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142; Interview 
with City Official, in City of Landskrona (May 19, 2014) (unnamed interviewee to 
preserve anonymity) (notes on file with author). 
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political push evident in the addition to the name “and Skåne,” as the 
region wants to be acknowledged as the “true” (i.e. formalized) 
regional representation for all municipalities within its territory.152  
Yet, it does not change the dominance of the further strengthened 
duopoly Copenhagen-Malmö, which further exacerbates the 
underlying unease about uneven regional voice between Malmö and 
the smaller municipalities and thus actual and perceived asymmetries 
in power and influence.  The smaller places are concerned about their 
scope for self-determination as the main cities gain agency.153 
The main attraction has been an extension of its hinterland for 
wider (and lower-cost) housing choices for Copenhagen residents, an 
increased consumer demand, and an enhanced employment pool in 
an international climate.154  The Øresund region conceptually has 
been convincing on its rationale.  But differences in taxation and 
currency, both national responsibilities, demonstrate the continued 
presence of the territorial state and imperfect anchoring between it 
and the Øresund space.155  Global economic changes, such as in 2008, 
which reduced the economic advantages of this collaboration quite 
significantly, simultaneously highlighted the importance of a win-win 
outcome for continued support for this form of a political-economic 
project.156 
The particular metropolitan interests in the Øresund Region are 
the drivers and oxygen of this regionalization project, and these are, 
in essence, selectively elitist, rather than representatively egalitarian 
for all municipalities.157  Even if located within the virtual boundary 
of the Øresund Region (or, since 2016), Greater Copenhagen and 
Skåne, involvement with the relevant policy network is not a given.  
And the different experiences of the winners and losers of this project 
are likely to create political differences in priorities and more support 
for conventional regionalism as a sign of collective state support, as 
 
 152. For instance, the somewhat provocatively titled “Denmark Wants to Re-
Brand Parts of Sweden as Greater Copenhagen.” See David Crouch, Denmark 
Wants to Re-Brand Parts of Sweden as Greater Copenhagen, GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/denmark-wants-to-rebrand-
part-of-sweden-as-greater-copenhagen [https://perma.cc/2ANG-9J5W]. 
 153. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142. 
 154. See Interview with Official, Øresund Committee, supra note 138. 
 155. See, e.g., id.; see also Interview with City Official, Invest in Skåne, Region 
Skåne Administration, supra note 147. 
 156. See id.; see Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 
142; see also Claire Nauwelaers et al., The Case of Oresund (Denmark-Sweden)—
Regions and Innovation: Collaborating Across Borders, 21 OECD Regional 
Development Working Papers (2013). 
 157. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142. 
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advantages from the Øresund region are felt much more indirectly in 
the Skåne periphery.158  It is for that reason that the city of 
Helsingborg, a larger player in the Øresund Region, and part of the 
‘urban elite,’ tries to act as interlocutor for its surrounding 
municipalities by having prompted the “Helsingborg Family” as a 
group of neighboring municipalities.159  This is to initiate the trickle-
down effect that neo-liberal enthusiasts claim makes more 
individualized competitiveness promising and justified.160 
Elsewhere, towns like Ystad on the southern coast, which consider 
themselves outside the imagined and functional Øresund region,161 
seek other possibilities to step out of the regional shadow and be 
more visible on their own through emphasis of individuality and thus 
a de facto rise above the more peripheral rural surroundings.162  
Participating in EU projects, even if they are about region-specific 
food as the main focus, serve as platform for internationalization as 
way out of peripherality in the shadow of the Øresund Region. 
Another form of local self-empowerment in a peripheral setting 
involves collaborative action among like-positioned municipalities.  
Such sub-regional networks subdivide Skåne into four smaller 
network-based regions – one in each corner.  It is a form of mutual 
assurance and support through occasional meetings just to keep in 
touch.163 
The Øresund’s competitive success was expected to ultimately 
benefit the whole of southern Sweden through improved links to the 
economic hub of Northwestern Europe, especially the global port of 
Hamburg.164  More than a decade later, this neo-liberal rationale 
turned out differently.  The already less well-connected and 
developing eastern, largely rural, part of Region Skåne feels even 
more distant and peripheralized, as all attention has turned to Malmö 
and the city-region along the western coast.165 
 
 158. See Nauwelaers, supra note 156. 
 159. See Interview with City Official, Mayor’s Office, supra note 146; see also The 
Family Helsingborg, HELSINGBORG, https://helsingborg.se/kommun-och-
politik/samarbete/regionalt/familjen-helsingborg/ [https://perma.cc/TWX9-423D]. 
 160. See Andreou, supra note 12. 
 161. Interview with Official, Ystad, Southeast Skåne Region Organization, supra 
note 143. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142; see 
Interview, Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142. 
 165. Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142; see 
Interview, Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142. 
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Since its inauguration eighteen years ago, the galvanizing effect of 
the Øresund Bridge has given way to a degree of normality, where 
activity across the sea no longer is viewed as such an extraordinary 
thing.166  Instead, territorial borders have regained their delimitating 
impact on spatial imaginations and narratives.  This has been 
especially true since the 2015 migration crisis in Europe, which 
brought the state back very visibly in the form of border controls at 
the bridge.167  The end of the virtual Øresund University as network 
of existing Danish and Swedish universities in the region in 2013168 
also points to a cooling of the trans-national idea of the Øresund.  It 
has lost some of its novelty effect, challenged by more visible and 
realized underlying troubles of uneven development and a growing 
divide between the successful urban centres and the more struggling 
peripheralized rest.169 
Here, it matters that the Øresund region has no “hard” political 
dimension of its own, as its governance operated until recently 
through the Øresund Committee170 and, since 2016, the Greater 
Copenhagen and Skåne Committee.171 A regional agenda does not 
yield electoral or political bonus points.  As such, there is no political 
lobbying on its behalf as a spatial entity.  Instead, the economically 
driven and narrated Øresund region needs to work through the 
respective underlying administrative structures and regulations.  
Borders, boundaries, and institutional and regulative differences 
continue to matter as needed “anchor points,”172 as do political 
considerations of likely electoral rewards.  It is for that reason, that 
the conventional (Scandinavian) egalitarian, collective perspective 
and rationale have come back to be considered as expression of the 
democratically underpinned state territory. 
 
 166. See Interview with Councillor, Lund City Council, supra note 142; see also 
Interview with City Official, Mayor’s Office, supra note 146. 
 167. While at Copenhagen’s Kastrup airport, Author observed make-shift detailed 
border control at the airport station for trains heading to Sweden,  with Swedish 
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 168. See Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142; see 
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 169. See Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142. 
 170. See Nauwelaers et al., supra note 156. 
 171. The Story of Malmö, MALMö STAD, http://Malmö.se/Nice-to-know-about-
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B.  Urban-Centric Øresund Region, Peripheralization, and 
Marginalization 
As evident from the Øresund example, peripheralization and 
marginalization are not merely the result of geographic distance from 
a core, but rather of a communicative, participative distance to 
functional networks between policy-making actors and their strategic 
alliances.  And this distance circumscribes the scope to participate in, 
and influence, decision-making and outcomes for oneself.  While 
infrastructure is important in communication and accessibility, 
individual agency in the form of building networks and alliances to 
further their own interests are equally as important.  Connectivity 
matters, be that conventionally communicative or relational alliances 
through networks.  Some of the “cores” (or nodes) may participate as 
actors in different networks for different agendas at the same time, 
boosting their presence and voice, and thus agenda. 
Networks may be overlapping and overlaying, following variable 
geometries of engagement and prioritising.  They are also, in turn, 
excluding and fragmenting, and thus produce differences in scope for 
engagement and participation through articulating a political voice.  
There is an invisible, but potentially very effective, line separating 
included and excluded localities and territorial parts of formal state 
territory, such as defined regions.  In the example used here, it is a 
distinction between the dynamic, internationally connected urban-
defined part “trading” under the banner of the Øresund Region 
strategic space, and the rural, less dynamic, more inward-looking and 
state-oriented, dependent hinterland to the east as dominant part of 
the formal Region Skåne. 
The urban-based inequality has been quite a delicate political issue 
for some time,173 but now the issue seems to gain recognition174 as the 
new Skåne Development Plan Open Skåne 2030 tentatively indicates.  
But cities have different responses to that, with some, as Malmö, 
quite openly following their own interests (“Malmö first”).175  Others, 
such as Helsingborg, are trying to downplay their stronger position 
vis-à-vis the surrounding municipalities to minimize tension and allow 
co-operation.176 Malmö and Lund will be the main drivers for the 
 
 173. See Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142. 
 174. See generally Development Skåne, REGION SKÅNE, https://utveckling.skane.se 
[https://perma.cc/42A6-NH9W]. 
 175. See Interview with Official, Region Skåne Administration, supra note 142. 
 176. See Interview with Helsingborg International Office, in City of Helsingborg 
(Dec. 11, 2014) (unnamed interviewee to preserve anonymity) (notes on file with 
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whole area, but the question remains to what extent the two cities 
want to be burdened with having to carry the whole region 
economically, thus making their own drive for competitiveness and 
international success more difficult and less immediately rewarding. 
The important political task is to find alternative ways to employ 
this conventional approach of merely redistributing economic growth 
potential.  The economically more successful option may be to 
manage, rather than seek to curtail, the different pathways and spatial 
orientations of the two parts of the Region.  This means going further 
with the integration in the Øresund Region to strengthen its 
competitive advantages.  This may lead to a further move towards a 
city region with growing urbanization, while seeking an alternative 
connector and development platform for the rest. 
C.  Democratic Responsiveness and “Affectedness” in a State Is 
Not “One Size Fits All” 
There is a growing differentiation of a territorial state as presumed 
uniform platform for democratic participation and expressing a 
democratic voice. Cities, and especially larger metropolitan areas, 
have developed a more explicit and audible political voice in 
promoting their interests at state and regional level. 
The political theorist Habermas speaks of communicative action177 
in relation to the all-affected principle,178 where everyone within a 
demographic (however defined) group, or territory, is subject to the 
same pressures, and most importantly, resulting decisions and 
responding political processes.  This involves the sense of being 
represented. How should we respond to the affectedness? Should it 
be through democracy from above, being taken care of by those in 
power including the nation state, or from below, where smaller units 
collaborate and self-organize?  This may mean to re-spatialize 
democratic imagination,179 which would include a sense of belonging 
and having influence.  But does this lead to emancipatory politics 
developing around the plurality of identities within cities and also 
across metropolitan areas, within broader city regions?  Only when 
 
 177. J. Habermas, ‘A Reply,’ in COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: ESSAYS ON JÜRGEN 
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 179. See generally Amin & Thrift, supra note 88, at 220, 226. 
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demos and democratic politics approach congruence can the notion of 
“all affectedness” and thus “all involved and relevant” be maintained 
or achieved. 
There is a need to consider place-based democracy and 
representation. Different localities or regions, as well as states, 
produce particular milieux for evaluating the need for, engagement 
with, and expectations from democratic processes and outcomes. This 
includes the role of civil society as politicized expression of the 
demos. It is here that the sense of satisfaction or disappointment with 
democratic structures and outcomes are shaped. This becomes 
evident in the different sense of ownership of democratic processes 
and resulting politics between Western and post-communist Eastern 
Europe, for instance, as the growing support for authoritarian leaders 
and restricted political debate and choices suggests. 
This global shift, and the populist Right in Western Europe, 
presents democracies as playgrounds of the elites, not really 
interested in the genuine needs of the people at large.  And the fact 
that these narratives, as well as the political responses evident in 
election results suggest clear metropolitan – non-metropolitan 
differences,180 points to variations that have developed of the purpose 
and desirability of representative democracies.181 Instead, the interest 
is in general principles of power relations between people and the 
state. 
Other important differences in traditions, which shape attitudes 
towards democratic procedures and willingness and scope to get 
involved, include the position of local governments.  How much 
genuine decision-making and political autonomy do they possess?  
For example, there is a clear difference between federal systems with 
forms of multi-level democratic autonomy, such as in federal systems 
(e.g., Germany or the U.S.) and centralized systems, where local 
government is a creature of higher level parliament (e.g., the UK or 
Canada). 
Places matter.  Urbanization creates new dynamics and new spatial 
patterns and relations with associated varying conditions for 
democratic contention, negotiation, and inclusion.  It is here that 
classical Marxist analysis has brought in structuration theory and the 
role of uneven affectedness of places (and people) by the effects of 
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global capitalism.182 Some places are more likely to benefit than 
others and this challenges the notions behind representative 
democracy. Furthermore, this inequality becomes more evident as the 
promise underlying the neo-liberal market economy model no longer 
seems to hold and some places, especially cities, seem to fare much 
better than others. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article examined the link between relationally shaped, 
agenda-driven network-defined spaces and conventional, state-
defined territoriality.  It is the degree of congruence between the two 
that circumscribes the scope for marrying the inherent dynamic and 
problem-solving nature of collaborative network policy and the more 
permanent geography of institutionalized universal legitimation and 
implementation of state power. 
This Article distinguished between (1) territory as a priori defined 
geographic entities within a state hierarchy and a clearly defined 
demos,183 and (2) ad hoc defined spaces of collaboration between 
like-interested actors.  The former serves as a vehicle for uniform 
democratic representation and linking state and the population as a 
whole, while the latter is inherently selective, mirroring group-specific 
interests and opportunities as they connect and collaborate to seek to 
maximise their own opportunity.  Collaboration is viewed as a means 
to individual ends.  The difference is thus the mechanism of inclusion: 
by territorial association and opportunistic ‘added value’ respectively.  
The two co-exist, as the case study of the Øresund Region illustrates.  
Their inter-relationships can be more or less complex, harmonious or 
conflictual, as they mirror varying degrees of congruence – or 
discrepancy. 
The crux of the matter rests in the ability to reconcile seemingly 
competing or conflicting or contradicting interests: finding a 
reconciling solution, which depends on political leadership and/or 
innovativeness in adopted political modi operandi. This may, for 
instance, involve the acceptance of the trans-scalar nature of local 
engagement, right up to an international representation, rather than 
viewing cities merely as integral part of a state. Or, collaborative 
action among actors, here cities, is used to enhance individual 
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capacity and prospects of gaining advantage.  The challenge is to 
reconcile two different, yet concurrent rationales and subsequent 
dynamics: confinement to the uniformity of state structure and self-
organizing collaborative local individualism to pursue specific 
agendas to individual advantage.  The crucial question, then, arises 
about how such innovative politics can achieve public support on the 
basis of established territorial patterns and public views of what 
constitutes appropriate representation of their interests. As we could 
observe over recent times, merely claiming that some vague general 
benefit will result from individual collaborations between leading 
actors may not suffice. Rather, notions of collusion among an elite to 
further their own advantage may only raise doubts about whose 
interests are being served. The choice seems to be between an 
unspecified elite running a democratic system to their own advantage, 
as populists like to claim, or broad popular engagement with 
democratic processes to take collective ownership of the workings 
and challenges of a representative democracy. 
 
